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* All computations were done inside the research data centre of the Statistical Office of Lower Saxony 
using Stata 10.1, and I thank Rita Hoffmeister for her help in preparing the data, running the Stata do-
file and checking the output for any violation of privacy. The data are confidential but not exclusive; 
see Zühlke et al. (2004) for information on how to access the data. To facilitate replication and 
extensions the Stata do-file used is available from me on request. Many thanks to Sebastian Troch for 
collecting and preparing the information on the presence or not of a co-determined supervisory board 
in the enterprises investigated in this study (see Troch 2009). Furthermore, I appreciate helpful 
comments on an earlier draft version by John T. Addison, Franziska Boneberg, Nils Braakmann, Knut 
Gerlach, Uwe Jirjahn, Thorsten Schank, Claus Schnabel and Sebastian Troch. Foremost, I thank 
Michael Adams who pointed out in private correspondence in April 2007 that Claus Schnabel and I in 
an unpublished draft paper made a serious mistake when we assumed that all companies who should 
have a co-determined supervisory board according to the law really do have one. This remark started 
the project that led to this paper.   2
1. Motivation 
Co-determination of workers can be regarded as an essential element of the system 
of industrial relations in Germany’s social market economy. Basically, there are two 
forms of it - employee representation at the level of the establishment (the local 
production unit) via works councils (i.e., betriebliche Mitbestimmung), and 
codetermination at the enterprise level (i.e., Unternehmensmitbestimmung) where 
employees are sitting on supervisory boards. While the economic consequences of 
German works councils for various dimensions of firm performance have been 
extensively investigated empirically,
1 much less is known about the effects of 
employees as members of supervisory boards. 
Details aside, we have today three different regimes of co-determination at the 
supervisory board level: In the (few) enterprises from the coal and steel industries 
with more than 1.000 employees there is full-parity codetermination (1951 
Codetermination Act); in enterprises with more than 2,000 employees we have quasi-
parity representation (1976 Codetermination Act) with a chairperson of board (who is 
elected by the shareholders) who has the casting vote in case of a tie; and one-third 
codetermination in enterprises with between 500 and 2,000 employees (2004 Third 
Part Act, or Drittelmitbestimmungsgesetz). In the economic discussion of the pros 
and cons of co-determination at the board level, there are mainly two theoretical lines 
                                                 
1 Details aside, a works council is found in establishments with at least 5 employees, provided that one 
has been elected by the employees. These works councils can have “two faces”. They can use their 
legal rights to delay or modify management decisions, and to redistribute rents to the employees. And 
they can improve efficiency (and thus the joint surplus) of the establishment due to information 
exchange, consultation and codetermination (see Freeman and Lazear (1995) for a formal model). 
Whether the net effect on firm performance is positive or negative is an empirical question. The bottom 
line after some 25 years of econometric research is that these effects are small on average, and that 
there is no evidence that works councils adversely effect firm performance (see Addison, Schnabel 
and Wagner (2004), Jirjahn (2006) and Addison (2009) for surveys of this literature, and Addison, 
Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2006, 2007) for recent studies). 
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of arguments that can be summarized in a nutshell as follows (see, e.g., Renaud 
2007). Property rights theory points out that co-determination weakens the residual 
decision rights of the owners, leads to less efficient or at least delayed decisions, 
lower productivity, less profitability, and rent shifting in favour of the employees. 
Participation theory suggests co-determination can improve efficiency (and thus the 
joint surplus) of the firm due to information exchange, consultation and 
codetermination (see Freeman and Lazear (1995) for a formal model in the context of 
co-determination at the establishment level via works councils).  
Whether the net effect of supervisory board level co-determination on firm 
performance is positive or negative, therefore, is an empirical question. Summarizing 
the findings from the (few) empirical studies on the effects of co-determination at the 
supervisory board level in a recent survey of this literature Addison and Schnabel 
(2009) argue that “the German system of codetermination at company level has not 
had (positive or negative) economic effects of a magnitude that would induce (other) 
companies (and governments) to adopt the system or to wholly abandon it.” Renaud 
(2007) draws a similar conclusion based on his survey of the empirical literature and 
on the results from his own study. 
This appraisal of the state of our current knowledge regarding the effects of 
board-level co-determination on enterprise performance is based on a small number 
of empirical studies.  Some of these studies are criticised by Addison and Schnabel 
(2009) for the methods applied, and most of them are based on rather small samples 
of data that cover years from the quite distant past. Empirical investigations of the 
relation between different degrees of co-determination at the supervisory board level 
(none, one-third, quasi-parity, full-parity) and firm performance are hindered by the 
lack of any information on co-determination in enterprise surveys from official 
statistics. Econometric studies on the co-determination – firm performance nexus,   4
therefore, are usually based on data sets collected by researchers using (publicly 
available) information on publicly-traded companies (Aktiengesellschaften) only.
2 
One critical point here is that these studies assume that all enterprises from a 
certain size class (500 – 2,000, or >2,000 employees) do have a supervisory board 
with a certain type of co-determination, i.e. quasi-parity codetermination according to 
the 1976 Codetermination Act for firms having more than 2,000 employees, or one-
third representation in companies with between 500 and 2,000 employees according 
to the Third Part Act of 2004 (or its forerunner, the 1952 Works Constitution Act). 
While the assumption that all firms do have a supervisory board is appropriate for 
publicly traded companies, it is not for the second large group of enterprises that is 
covered by the German co-determination laws, the limited liability companies 
(Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, GmbH). Experts for labour law and industrial 
relations point out that, contrary to the law, such limited liability companies very often 
do not have a supervisory board at all, and, therefore, are not co-determined firms.
3 It 
should be noted that according to the law there is no penalty for limited liability 
companies that do not install a supervisory board, but that employees do have the 
opportunity to enforce its installation by going to court. 
If there really is such a thing as a large co-determination free zone among 
limited liability companies that fall under the Third Part Act of 2004,
4 and if it is known 
                                                 
2 Cases in point include Gorton and Schmid (2004) who use data for the largest 250 non-financial 
traded stock corporations for the period 1989 to 1993, and Fauver and Fuerst (2006) where the 
sample consists of all publicly traded German corporations as of 2003. Stettes (2007) uses data from 
a survey of CEOs and leaders of supervisory boards for a descriptive study. 
3 I thank Michael Adams who pointed this out to me in private correspondence in April 2007. 
4 Note that if this condition holds any type of regression discontinuity design comparing limited liability 
companies with (slightly) less and (slightly) more than 500 employees can not identify differences 
between firms with and without one-third codetermination at the supervisory board level, and the same 
holds for limited liability companies with up to and more than 2,000 employees in the case of one-third 
versus quasi-parity co-determination.   5
which limited liability companies with 500 to 2,000 employees do have a co-
determined supervisory board and which do not, this information can be used to 
compare the performance of firms from within this size class with and without co-
determination. 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the co-determination – firm 
performance nexus by using exactly this type of information on the presence or not of 
a co-determined supervisory board in limited liability companies covered by the Third 
Part Act of 2004. In doing so it follows a suggestion by Renaud (2007) for further 
research, namely to compare supervisory board-codetermined enterprises with 
enterprises without any employee representatives in a board at all. It uses a new type 
of data that combines information on the co-determination status of enterprises from 
a commercial data base and supplementary information collected from the firms with 
comprehensive data on the firms from official statistics. These data (that are for 
2006, and, therefore, of a much more recent vintage than most of the data used 
before to investigate the supervisory board codetermination – firm performance 
nexus) allow for the first time a direct comparison of enterprises from the same size 
class with and without a co-determination supervisory board. 
It has to be pointed out explicitly that in the particular case of one-third 
codetermination at the supervisory board in limited liability companies one of the two 
faces of codetermination – the “ugly” one that is at the centre of the property rights 
theory, and that argues that co-determination weakens the residual decision rights of 
the owners, leads to less efficient or at least delayed decisions, lower productivity, 
less profitability, and rent shifting in favour of the employees – can be expected to be 
more or less absent, or at least not to show up distinctly. The reason for this is that 
the supervisory board in a limited liability company has only restricted rights 
                                                                                                                                                          
   6
compared to the supervisory board in a publicly traded company with 500 to 2000 
employees. While in the latter case the supervisory board has the right to “hire and 
fire” the management board members and to monitor their performance, and to 
approve the annual balance, this role is fulfilled by the assembly of owners 
(Gesellschafterversammlung) in the case of a limited liability company. A supervisory 
board under the Third Part Act of 2004, therefore, can be classified as having mainly 
information rights, while as a rule decision rights are in the hands of the assembly of 
owners.
5 Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the one-third board representation 
option in general, and especially in limited liability companies, is often viewed as an 
absence of codetermination. However, the “beautiful” face of codetermination that is 
pointed out by participation theory, suggesting that co-determination can improve 
efficiency (and thus the joint surplus) of the firm due to information exchange and 
consultation, might show up here. It is an empirical question that has not been 
investigated before econometrically whether this is the case, and if so, to which 
extent. 
To preview the most important result (which is in line with the conclusions 
drawn by Addison and Schnabel (2009) cited above), one-third co-determination at 
the supervisory board level in limited-liability enterprises from West German 
manufacturing industries seems to be neither positively nor negatively related to two 
core firm performance indicators, productivity and profitability. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the new 
data, section 3 contains the empirical investigation, and section 4 discusses the 
results. 
 
                                                 
5 The division of rights between the supervisory board and the assembly of owners might vary from 
case to case according to decisions taken by the owners; see Fuchs and Köstler (2005) for a detailed 
discussion.   7
2. Data 
As said, enterprise surveys from official statistics do not contain any information on 
the presence or not of a co-determined supervisory board in the firms sampled. Such 
information, however, is available from a commercial data base, the Hoppenstedt 
Datenbank Grossunternehmen (see www.hoppenstedt-grossunternehmen.de). This 
data base contains information on the 25,000 largest enterprises in Germany with at 
least 200 employees and/or a sales volume of at least 20 Mio. Euro. Coverage for 
enterprises with 500 or more employees is complete in this data base. 
In this data base it is reported whether or not an enterprise has a supervisory 
board (and its size), and whether or not worker representatives are among the board 
members (and their number). This information on the presence or not of a 
supervisory board and its composition, however, is not available for all enterprises. In 
this project, for limited liability enterprises from manufacturing industries in West 
Germany that had between 550 and 1975 employees
6 missing information was 
collected via telephone calls.
7  
The most important result from an empirical investigation using these data is 
that only some 60 percent of all limited liability companies from German 
manufacturing industries that fell under the Third Party Act of 2004 had a co-
determined supervisory board in 2007/2008 (Troch 2009). This provides evidence for 
the existence of a large co-determination free zone among limited liability companies 
with 500 to 2.000 employees. 
                                                 
6 The Third Part Act of 2004 covers enterprises with 500 to 2000 employees. The different critical 
values used in this project were selected to take care of the degree of fuzzy-ness that is often given at 
the threshold values. 
7 A detailed description of the data and the process of its collection can be found in Troch (2009). 
Boneberg (2009) reports comparable data for the West German services sector industries.   8
This fact offers the possibility for an empirical investigation of the relationship 
between supervisory board level co-determination and firm performance based on a 
direct comparison of co-determined and co-determination free firms from the same 
size class with the same legal form. To perform this investigation, information on the 
presence or not of a co-determined supervisory board in an enterprise (taken from 
the Hoppenstedt data base, or collected via telephone) was merged with data from a 
second source, the cost structure survey for enterprises in the manufacturing sector 
by the Statistical Offices.
8 
This survey is carried out annually as a representative random sample survey 
(stratified according to the number of employees and the industries) of around 18.000 
enterprises. All enterprises with 500 or more employees are included in each survey. 
A detailed description of the cost structure survey can be found in Fritsch et al. 
(2004). Data from the most recent available cost structure survey for 2006 are used 
to construct measures for two core dimensions of firm performance, productivity and 
profitability. 
Productivity is measured as value added at factor costs per employee. Note 
that any measure of total factor productivity cannot be computed because of a lack of 
information on the capital stock
9 in the survey. In the econometric investigation the 
                                                 
8 Merging was done using information about the register number and register court of the trade 
register (Handelsregisternummer und Handelsregistergericht) for the enterprise, because this 
information is available in both the Hoppenstedt data base and in the official register of enterprises 
(Unternehmensregister) that was linked with the cost structure survey data. Merging firm level data 
from official statistics and from other sources is legal according to §13a of the Federal Statistics Law 
(Bundesstatistikgesetz) provided the data from external sources are publicly available. This is the case 
with the data on co-determination used here, because they are either taken from the publicly (though 
not costless) available Hoppenstedt data base, or published as an appendix to Troch (2009) that is 
available from the web free of charge (see www.leuphana.de/vwl/papers no. 128a). 
9 Information about investment is available from a different survey that can be linked to the cost 
structure survey, and this information might be used to approximate the capital stock in a firm. A close 
inspection of the investment data, however, reveals that many firms report no or only a very small   9
amount of depreciation per employee (that can be expected to by closely linked to 
the capital stock per employee) is used as a proxy variable for the unobserved capital 
intensity.
10   
Profits are computed as a rate of return, defined as gross firm surplus 
(computed as gross value added at factor costs minus gross wages and salaries 
minus costs for social insurance paid by the firm) divided by total sales (net of VAT) 
minus net change of inventories. As the data set does not have any information on 
the capital stock, or the sum of assets or equity, of the firm, it is not possible to 
construct profit indicators based thereon like return on assets or return on equity. Our 
profit measure is a measure for the price-cost margin which, under competitive 
conditions, should on average equal the required rental on assets employed per 
money unit of sales (see Schmalensee (1989), p. 960f.). Differences in profitability 
between firms, therefore, can follow from productivity differences, but also from 
different mark-ups of prices over costs and from differences in the capital intensity 
(for which the depreciation per employee is used as a proxy variable). 
From the data base (described in detail in Troch (2009)) that includes all 
limited liability companies from West German manufacturing industries that are 
covered by the Third Part Act (Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz) information for 333 
enterprises could be matched to the cost structure survey data from official 
                                                                                                                                                          
amount of investment in many years, while others report huge values in one year. Any attempt to 
compute a capital stock measure based on these data would result in a proxy that seems to be 
useless. 
10 Note that Bartelsman and Doms (2000, p. 575) point to the fact that heterogeneity in labor 
productivity has been found to be accompanied by similar heterogeneity in total factor productivity in 
the reviewed research where both concepts are measured. Furthermore, Foster, Haltiwanger and 
Syverson (2008) show that productivity measures that use sales (i.e. quantities multiplied by prices) 
and measures that use quantities only are highly positively correlated.   10
statistics.
11 From these enterprises 273 are classified as stable over time with regard 
to the presence or not of a co-determined supervisory board, because we do not 
have any information from the Hoppenstedt data base CD for 2005 that the co-
determination status was different in 2005 compared to 2007.  
The 273 enterprises with a stable co-determination status over the period 
2005 to 2007 form the sample that is used in the empirical investigation. From these 
firms 159 (or 58.2) have a co-determined supervisory board, while 114 do not.
12  
 
3. Empirical  investigation 
We start the empirical investigation by looking at differences in labour productivity 
and profits between enterprises with and without co-determination at the supervisory 
board level to document the existence and size of the unconditional productivity and 
profitability differential. According to the results of a t-test on mean differences this 
differential was statistically significant at an error level of 4 percent, and large from an 
economic point of view, for productivity – enterprises with co-determination are on 
average 22% more productive that firms without co-determination (see table 1). 
Contrary to this, the difference in mean profitability between enterprises from both 
groups is not statistically different from zero at any conventional level of significance. 
 
                                                 
11  The data for the other 63 enterprises that were sent to the research data centre of the statistical 
office of Lower Saxony could not be matched to the data from official statistics. About two thirds of 
these enterprises were registered not in manufacturing but in other industries (trade or services), so 
that no information about these firms is included in the cost structure survey that covers manufacturing 
industries only. For the remaining firms there is either no entry in the official register of enterprises, or 
the enterprise numbers in the register are not the most recent ones included in our data base. Due to 
data protection laws it is impossible for me to try to solve these problems with regard to missing 
matches. 
12 Note that this is well in line with the results reported by Troch (2009) on the proportion of enterprises 
with a co-determined supervisory board among all firms covered by him that are mentioned above.   11
[Table 1 near here] 
 
If one looks at differences in the mean value for both groups of enterprises 
only, one focuses on just one moment of the productivity (or profit) distribution. A 
stricter test that considers all moments is a test for stochastic dominance of the 
productivity distribution for enterprises with co-determination at the supervisory board 
over the productivity distribution for non-codetermined firms. More formally, let F and 
G denote the cumulative distribution functions of productivity for firms with and 
without co-determination. Then F(x) – G(x)  = 0 means that the two distributions do 
not differ, and first order stochastic dominance of F relative to G means that F(z) – 
G(z) must be less or equal zero for all values of z, with strict inequality for some z. 
Whether this holds or not is tested non-parametrically by using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test (see  Delgado, Farinas and Ruano (2002)).  
Results reported in table 1 indicate that according to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test the two productivity distributions for firms with and without co-determination at 
the supervisory board level do differ, and that the distribution for firms with co-
determination first-order stochastically dominates the distribution for firms without co-
determination. Contrary to this, the two profitability distributions do not differ 
according to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. 
The next step of the empirical investigation consists in the estimation of 
empirical models that regress productivity (or profitability) on a dummy variable that 
indicates the presence or not of a co-determined supervisory board in the firm plus 
control variables. Note that the regression equations estimated here are not meant to 
be empirical models that aim to explain labour productivity or profits at the firm level. 
The data set at hand here is not rich enough for such an exercise. The equations are 
just a vehicle to test for, and estimate the size of, any (positive or negative) premium   12
associated with the presence of a co-determined supervisory board, controlling for 
other firm characteristics that are included in the empirical model. Productivity 
differences at the firm level are known to be notoriously difficult to explain empirically. 
“At the micro level, productivity remains very much a measure of our ignorance.” 
(Bartelsman and Doms 2000, p. 586) The same holds for profits.  
In the first empirical model productivity and profitability is regressed on a 
dummy variable that indicates the presence or not of a co-determined supervisory 
board in the firm plus a set of 2digit industry identifiers.
13 These industry dummy 
variables control for industry specific structural differences (related to the extent of 
competition, the technology of production, etc.) and shocks (related to the demand 
for products or the costs of production). Results are reported in table 2 for model (1) 
and (3) respectively. The estimated regression coefficient of the dummy variable that 
indicates the presence or not of a codetermined supervisory board is not statistically 
significant at any conventional level. Note that for productivity this result differs from 
the descriptive evidence reported in table 1 above – controlling for industry specific 
differences matters. 
[Table 2 near here] 
 
In the next step the empirical model is augmented by a number of control 
variables. Results are reported in table 2 for model (2) and (4) respectively. The most 
important result here is that the estimated coefficient of the co-determination dummy 
variable is not statistically significant in the augmented model for productivity or for 
profitability at any conventional error level. 
                                                 
13 Due to a small number of enterprises in some 2digit industries the following industries were merged 
so that at least 3 enterprises are in an industry that is included in the empirical models: 15 and 16; 17, 
18 and 19; 20, 21 and 22; 23 and 24.   13
Regarding the control variables, the first is the number of employees (and its 
squared value to control for a non-linear relation). The reason is that the probability of 
finding a co-determined supervisory board is higher in larger firms (see Troch (2009) 
and the descriptive evidence for the sample used here reported in table 3), and that 
firm size might be related to productivity and profitability, too. Both coefficients of the 
firm size variables are not statistically different from zero at any conventional level of 
significance. While this might come as a surprise, it can be explained by the fact that 
by construction all enterprises included in the sample are from one size class (with 
550 to 1975 employees). 
[Table 3 near here] 
 
Next, the amount of depreciation per employee is included as a proxy variable 
for capital intensity (see the discussion in section 2 above). Note that the estimated 
coefficient for depreciation per employee (the proxy variable for capital intensity) is 
not statistically significantly related with productivity but with profitability.  
As a robustness check, the models described above were augmented by other 
firm characteristics that can be expected to be related to both productivity and 
profitability. The first firm characteristic is the amount of subsidies per employee 
received by an enterprise. In the cost structure survey subsidies are defined as any 
unrequited payments received from federal, regional or local authorities, or from the 
European Communities, to lower costs of production and/or to lower the prices of 
goods produced and/or to allow sufficient payments for factors of production. We 
therefore expect that subsidies are higher in “weaker” firms with lower productivity 
and lower profits. The second firm characteristic is the share of employees in 
research and development (R&D) in all employees. R&D activities are expected to 
lead to higher productivity due to improved production processes, and to higher value   14
added per employee due to innovative products that can be sold for higher prices on 
national and international markets. Both improved production processes and 
innovative products can be expected to lead to higher profits, too. Note that the 
estimated coefficients of both variables have the expected signs, and that all of them 
are (at least, marginally) statistically significant. 
Furthermore, the models were augmented by a dummy variable indicating 
whether the enterprise is a family-owned firm (Familienunternehmen) or not, plus an 
interaction term of this dummy variable and the dummy variable indicating the 
presence or not of a co-determined supervisory board. The reason for this is that, on 
the one hand, family-owned enterprises are known to have a lower probability to 
have a co-determined supervisory board compared to other types of firms (as shown 
in Troch (2009) for manufacturing and Boneberg (2009) for services).
14 On the other 
hand, family-owned enterprises are said often to be managed differently, with a focus 
more on long-run survival than on short-run profitability. Controlling for family-
ownership status, therefore, might be important in empirical models that look at the 
relationship between supervisory board level co-determination and firm performance. 
Results show that the conclusions do not change. Neither the dummy variable 
indicating co-determination, nor the interaction term between this dummy variable 
and the dummy variable indicating a family-owned business, is statistically different 
from zero at any conventional level of significance. 
The bottom line, then, is that after controlling for industry and a number of firm 
characteristics, one-third codetermination at the supervisory board level seems to be 
neither positively nor negatively related to two core firm performance indicators, 
productivity and profitability. 
                                                 
14 In our sample 12 out of 39, or 30.1%, of the family-owned firms have a co-determined supervisory 
board, while this is the case in 147 out of 234 (or 62.8%) of the other types of firms.   15
 
4. Discussion 
To put the results that are presented above into perspective the following points 
should be mentioned: 
First of all, although the data used in the empirical investigation are in part 
based on panel data (stemming from the panel data of the cost structure survey) only 
cross-section data could be used. The reason is that the presence or not of a co-
determined supervisory board in the enterprises included in the sample used here 
does not change over time - by construction, and due to the way the data are 
collected. Therefore, it is not possible to use panel data from the cost structure 
survey, augmented by the information on the presence or not of a co-determined 
supervisory board, and to include fixed enterprise effects in the empirical model to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level. Unobserved heterogeneity can 
be due to differences in the quality of the management of a firm, and this 
management quality can be related to the presence or not of a co-determined 
supervisory board. Correlation between the (observed) presence or not of a co-
determined supervisory board and the (unobserved) quality of management leads to 
biased estimates of the coefficient of the co-determination dummy variable in the 
empirical models considered above, and given that we can not be sure whether the 
quality of management is systematically higher or lower in firms with or without co-
determination at the board level, the direction of the bias is unknown.  
Furthermore, in the empirical models investigated in this note the presence or 
not of a co-determined supervisory board is exogenously determined, and fixed. 
Therefore, it is not possible to investigate the causal effects of co-determination at 
the board level on firm performance by considering co-determination as a treatment 
that is given to some firms and not to others, and to look at the average treatment   16
effect on the treated firms. To investigate these causal effects information on a 
sample of firms is needed where at time t none of the firms has a co-determined 
supervisory board, and at time t+1 some become co-determined, so that we can 
compare the performance of the two groups of firms after t+1 (taking care of the fact 
that the introduction or not of a co-determined supervisory board might not be 
random but systematically linked to characteristics of the firm).
15  
What is more, considering the presence or not of a third-part co-determined 
supervisory board as given means that it is not possible to control for any self-
selection of firms into co-determination. The presence of a co-determined 
supervisory board may not be randomly, it might well be the result of an optimization 
process of the owners or managers of a limited liability company. For example, it 
might well be the case that owners or managers of a firm foster (or, at least, do not 
hinder) the introduction of a co-determined supervisory board if they expect that this 
will be in favour of the performance of the firm. Any attempt to control for this type of 
self-selection via a Heckman-type approach, however, needs at least one variable 
that is important for the decision to install a co-determined supervisory board but that 
is not relevant for either productivity or profitability. Given the absence of any such 
variable in the data set this approach to control for self-selection into third-part co-
determination is not possible.
16 
                                                 
15 For an example how to design an empirical study that takes into account unobserved heterogeneity, 
and that performs an investigation of the causal effect of a treatment on firm performance, see 
Wagner (2007) who looks at the effect of exporting on firm productivity. 
16 This problem is well known from the literature on the economic effects of works councils. There 
have been attempts to endogenize works councils presence, but identification is particularly difficult in 
this case (see Addison, Schnabel and Wagner 2004: 271). Therefore, recent empirical investigations 
on the effects of works councils usually use a matching approach (see e.g. Addison et al. 2007). 
   17
The impossibility to control for unobserved heterogeneity caused by 
differences in the quality of the management, the impossibility to perform an analysis 
of the causal effects of co-determination at the supervisory board level, and the 
impossibility to control for possible self-selection of firms into third-part co-
determination severely limits the empirical study presented here. We look at 
correlations, controlling for observables, and can not go any further. However, using 
a newly available tailor-made data set, this note presents at least first evidence from 
a direct comparison of co-determined and non-codetermined enterprises that, 
controlling for industry and a number of firm characteristics, one-third 
codetermination at the supervisory board level of limited liability companies seems to 
be neither curse nor blessing.  
On the one hand, this finding of no evidence for any negative effects of co-
determination on productivity and profitability may come at no surprise if one takes 
into account the fact discussed above that the supervisory board in a limited liability 
company has only very restricted rights. However, given that according to a widely 
held opinion one-third co-determination is considered by owners of enterprises as a 
vehicle to reduce the value of a firm and, therefore, as an obstacle for growth 
because enterprise decide not to grow further if this would lead to a crossing of the 
threshold of 500 employees where the Third Part Act of 2004 bites (see, e.g., Adams 
2006), it is important to have empirical evidence showing that there seems to be no 
such thing as a negative effect of one-third co-determination, at least not in limited 
liability companies from manufacturing industries in West Germany.  
On the other hand, the absence of any evidence for a positive effect as 
pointed out by participation theory, suggesting that co-determination can improve 
efficiency (and thus the joint surplus) of the firm due to information exchange and 
consultation, can inform ongoing policy debates over one-third codetermination.   18
While this type of codetermination might be favoured as an important element of a 
social market economy for wider political reasons, it can not be expected (again, at 
least not in limited liability companies from manufacturing industries in West 
Germany) to have positive effects on two core elements of firm performance that are 
important for economic dynamics, productivity and profitability. From an economic 
point of view, therefore, there seems to be no argument in favour of enforcing the 
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Studies 124(4): 567-578. Table 1:  Differences between enterprises with and without co-determination at the board level  
 
 
   Enterprises   Enterprises   t-test   Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test  (p-values) 
   without    with    on  mean    
   co-determination  co-determination  difference  H0:  equality  of distributions   H0: differences    H0: differences  
                    (p-value)         for enterprises                     favourable for                
favourable for 
      Mean      Mean                 with and without          firms without         firms with   





Value  added   72,678    88,650    0.041    0.002     0.001    0.993 
per employee (€)  (40,617)    (85,327) 
 
 
Rate  of  profit  (%)  9.00    7.87    0.255    0.220     0.421    0.110 
   (7.26)    (9.03) 
 
















 Table 2:      Co-determination at the board level and enterprise performance: Regression results 
 
 
     Performance  indicator:    Performance  indicator: 
     Value  added  per  employee  (€)   Rate  of  profit  (%) 
 




Co-determination   ß  5,561.02  630.45    -1.447   -1.422 
(Dummy;  1  =  yes)   p  0.353   0.890    0.158   0.249 
  
 
Number  of  employees   ß    -9.193      0.0014 
     p     0 . 4 6 8         
 0.566      
Number  of  employees   ß    0.0009      -3.61e-7
  
(squared)      p      0.720                                                        0.460 
  
 
Depreciation  per     ß    3.848      0.00017 
employee  (€)    p    0.146      0.018 
 
Subsidies  per  employee  (€)  ß    -4.015      -0.0011 
    p    0.013         0.008 
 
Share  of  employees  in   ß    972.56         0.152 
research  and  development  (%)  p    0.087      0.037 
 
Family  owned  enterprise  ß    -5,172.02     2.325 
(Dummy;  1  =  yes)   p    0.357      0.112 
 
Interaction  term:  ß    -8,751      -2.591 
Co-determination  *    Family  p    0.392      0.349 
owned enterprise 
 
2digit  industrie  dummies  included included    included   included
    
(15 industries) 
 
Constant    ß  78,741.81  56,299    9.18   5.930 
    p  0.000   0.000    0.000   0.001 
 
R-squared     0.095   0.304    0.059   0.129 
 





Note: Enterprises are limited liability companies from German manufacturing industries with 550 to 1975 
employees; data are for 2006. OLS regression with robust standard errors.  Table 3:  Descriptive statistics for variables used in the regressions reported in table 2 
 
 
      
         C o m p l e t e   S a m p l e    E n t e r p r i s e s   w i t h o u t    E n t e r p r i s e s   w i t h  




Value  added  per  employee  (€)   Mean     81,980.64    72,677.99    88,650.46 
     Standard  deviation   70,547.35    40,617.21    85,327.48 
 
Rate  of  profit  (%)    Mean     8.343     8.999     7.873 
     Standard  deviation   8.340     7.264     9.027 
 
Co-determination    Mean     0.582     0     1 
(Dummy;  1  =  yes)    Standard  deviation   0.494     0     0 
 
Number  of  employees    Mean     933.99     737.87     1,074.61 
     Standard  deviation   518.72     313.24     587.69 
     
Number of employees      Mean       1,140,426    641,710.4    1,497,996 
(squared)     Standard  deviation   1,956,196    638,615.4    2,447,028 
    
Subsidies  per  employee  (€)   Mean     81.89     44.37     108.80 
     Standard  deviation   736.07     364.24     914.37 
 
Share  of  employees  in    Mean     5.63     5.40     5.79 
research  and  development  (%)   Standard  deviation   9.06     9.96     8.38 
 




Note: Enterprises are limited liability companies from German manufacturing industries with 550 to 1975 employees; data are for 2006.  
 
 
 